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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
         The National Security Agency revoked Ann Stehney's 
security clearance after she refused to submit to a polygraph 
examination.  As a result, the Institute for Defense Analyses 
terminated her employment.  Alleging constitutional and statutory 
violations, Stehney sought a writ of mandamus and other 
appropriate relief.  The district court dismissed her suit under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) and Stehney now appeals. 
                 I.  Facts and Procedural History 
         Ann Stehney is a mathematician.  In l982, she left a 
tenured position at Wellesley College to work for the Institute 
for Defense Analyses at the Center for Communications Research in 
Princeton, New Jersey.  The Institute is a private think tank 
that conducts cryptological research -- the making and breaking 
of secret codes -- as a contractor for the National Security 
Agency, an agency within the Department of Defense that gathers 
and protects intelligence information related to national 
security. To conduct this research, Institute employees like 
Stehney require access to classified information.  Before 
granting access, NSA conducts a thorough background investigation 
of each person and makes "an overall common sense determination." 
DCID 1/14, Annex A.  The NSA background investigation includes a 
review of personal history, criminal, financial and medical 
records, and at least one interview.  NSA must ensure that access 
to classified information is "clearly consistent with the 
national security," and "any doubt concerning a person's 
continued eligibility must be resolved in favor of the national 
security."  NSA/CSS Reg. 122-06. 
         In 1982 NSA investigated Stehney and granted her a 
security clearance.  NSA is authorized by statute and regulations 
to use polygraph examinations as part of its investigations, see29 U.S.C. 
§ 2006(b) and DCID 1/14 Annex A, and since 1953 has 
used polygraphs in all investigations of NSA employees.  Dep't. 
of Defense, The Accuracy and Utility of Polygraph Testing 11 
(1984).  But in 1982 when Stehney was hired by the Institute, 
NSA did not ask her to take a polygraph examination because it 
believed that requiring polygraph examinations might impede 
recruitment by NSA contractors.  Shortly after Stehney was hired, 
the Department of Defense changed this policy and authorized use 
of polygraph examinations for all persons with access to 
classified information, including contractor employees.   
         In 1989, Stehney signed a Contractor Employee Advisory 
Handout informing her that she was "subject to an aperiodic 
review" of her security clearance, that review would be conducted 
with the aid of a polygraph examination, and that "[f]ailure to 
consent to an aperiodic polygraph examination may result in 
denial of continued access" to classified information. 
         In 1992, NSA asked Stehney to submit to a polygraph 
examination.  Stehney refused because she believes polygraph 
examinations are scientifically unsound and inherently 
unreliable.  NSA revoked Stehney's security clearance because she 
refused to take the polygraph examination.  Shortly thereafter, 
the Institute terminated Stehney's employment because she no 
longer possessed a security clearance. 
         After exhausting administrative remedies, Stehney filed 
suit in the United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey against Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, two current 
and one former NSA administrators, the Institute for Defense 
Analyses, and its director David Goldschmidt.  Stehney's 
complaint alleged that:  NSA failed to follow its binding agency 
regulations during the security clearance revocation process 
(Count 1); NSA deprived her of a constitutionally protected 
interest without due process of law (Count 2); NSA's requirement 
that she submit to a polygraph examination violated the Fourth 
Amendment (Count 3); NSA's policy of exempting certain 
mathematicians from the polygraph requirement denied her equal 
protection under the law (Count 4); NSA's and the Institute's 
policies requiring polygraph examinations violated New Jersey 
employment law (Count 5); and the Institute's failure to assist 
Stehney in securing an exemption from the polygraph requirement 
in the same manner it assisted similarly situated male employees 
violated New Jersey anti-discrimination law (Count 6).  Stehney 
sought a writ of mandamus and other appropriate relief to require 
NSA to reinstate her clearance or reconsider its revocation and 
to require the Institute to reinstate her employment.     
         The district court dismissed Count 1 under Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 12(b)(1) because Stehney lacked standing, her suit was barred 
by the political question doctrine and by sovereign immunity, and 
because she had not met the requirements for a writ of mandamus 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1361.  The district court dismissed Stehney's 
constitutional claims in Counts 2, 3, and 4 under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim for which relief can be 
granted.  The court dismissed Count 5 because her state law claim 
was preempted by federal law and declined to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over Count 6 because all federal claims 
had been dismissed.  Stehney v. Perry, 907 F. Supp. 806, (D.N.J. 
1995).  Stehney now appeals the dismissal of Counts 1, 2, 4, 5, 
and 6. 
             II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
         We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Although 
we typically review mandamus decisions for abuse of discretion, 
we review non-discretionary elements de novo. See Arnold v. BLaST 
Intermediate Unit 17, 843 F.2d 122 (3d Cir. 1988).  The remaining 
issues on appeal are subject to plenary review.  Hutchins v. 
I.R.S., 67 F.3d 40, 42 (3d Cir. 1995) (dismissal for standing 
subject to plenary review); State of New Jersey v. United States, 
91 F.3d 463, 466 (3d Cir. 1996) (dismissal of political question 
and dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) subject to 
plenary review); Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 
694 (3d Cir. 1996) (dismissal for sovereign immunity subject to 
plenary review); Coleman v. Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491, 1497 (3d Cir. 
1996) (jurisdiction questions subject to plenary review); Susan 
N. v. Wilson School Dist., 70 F.3d 751, 763 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(dismissal for preemption subject to plenary review). 
                      III.  Threshold Issues 
A.  Standing             
         The district court dismissed Stehney's claim that NSA 
failed to follow its regulations in revoking her security 
clearance because it found that she lacked standing.  Because 
Stehney was no longer employed at the Institute, the district 
court observed she no longer possessed the "need to know" 
classified information, a prerequisite for security clearance.  
Nor did the district court believe the Institute was under an 
obligation to rehire Stehney even if her security clearance were 
restored.  In these circumstances, the district court concluded 
her claim was based on speculation "about what a third-party 
might do in hypothetical future circumstances," and therefore 
insufficient to establish standing and to warrant an effective 
remedy.  Stehney, 907 F. Supp. 806, 815-16.  We disagree. 
         In Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959), an employee 
was dismissed from a private company because of the revocation of 
his government security clearance.  The Supreme Court found the 
plaintiff had standing to challenge the security clearance 
decision:  "We note our agreement . . . that petitioner has 
standing to bring this suit. . . . Respondents' actions, directed 
at petitioner as an individual, caused substantial injuries, and 
were they the subject of a suit between private persons, they 
could be attacked as an invasion of a legally protected right to 
be free from arbitrary interference in private contractual 
relationships."  Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. at 493 n.22 
(citations omitted).   
         Greene is factually indistinguishable from this case.  
Stehney too has suffered a substantial injury -- loss of her 
employment.  She too was fired because of the government's 
allegedly arbitrary interference in her private contractual 
relationship with the Institute.  Of course, we recognize that 
Greene was decided in 1959 and since then, the Supreme Court has 
clarified the test for standing.  We will look, therefore, at the 
recently articulated standard.   
         The Supreme Court established a three-part test for 
Article III standing in Valley Forge Christian College v. 
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 
U.S. 464 (1982):  "Art. III requires the party who invokes the 
court's authority to show that he personally has suffered some 
actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal 
conduct of the defendant, and that the injury fairly can be 
traced to the challenged action and is likely to be redressed by 
a favorable decision."  Id. at 472 (internal quotations and 
citations omitted).  See also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 
(1984) (applying Valley Forge test); Schering Corp. v. Food and 
Drug Admin., 51 F.3d 390, 395 (3d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 116 
S. Ct. 274 (1995). 
         The current standing test also includes non- 
constitutional elements.  As the Court noted:  "Even when a case 
falls within these constitutional boundaries, a plaintiff may 
still lack standing under the prudential principles by which the 
judiciary seeks to avoid deciding questions of broad social 
import where no individual rights would be vindicated and to 
limit access to the federal courts to those litigants best suited 
to assert a particular claim."  Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of 
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979).  These non-constitutional 
prudential considerations "require that: (1) a litigant assert 
his [or her] own legal interests rather than those of third 
parties; (2) courts refrain from adjudicating abstract questions 
of wide public significance which amount to generalized 
grievances; and (3) a litigant demonstrate that her interests are 
arguably within the zone of interests intended to be protected by 
the statute, rule, or constitutional provision on which the claim 
is based."  Wheeler v. Travelers Ins. Co., 22 F.3d 534, 538 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (internal citations and quotations omitted; citing and 
quoting from Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804 
(1985); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1975); and Valley 
Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of 
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982)).   
         Application of these standards demonstrates that 
Stehney possesses standing.  Stehney's loss of her security 
clearance and job, an alleged result of NSA's revocation of her 
security clearance in disregard of agency regulations and her 
rights to due process and equal protection, constitutes 
sufficient injury for standing purposes and can be traced to 
defendants' conduct. See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 493 
n.22 (1959) (plaintiff who lost private sector job when 
government revoked his security clearance has standing to bring 
suit against government alleging due process violations in 
revocation process; government's actions were "directed at" 
plaintiff and "caused substantial injury").  Her injury is also 
likely to be redressed by a favorable decision, because NSA would 
undoubtedly conduct a new review of Stehney's clearance if 
ordered to do so.   
         Stehney has also satisfied the non-Article III 
prudential standing requirements.  She is asserting her own 
rights and not those of a third party.  Violation of 
constitutional and regulatory rights is not an "abstract" or 
"generalized grievance."  Finally, as the target of NSA 
regulatory action, Stehney's interests fall within the zone of 
interests protected by the constitutional and regulatory 
provisions on which her case is based.   
         Moreover, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts 
have on several occasions allowed private sector and government 
employees to bring suit against the government for claims arising 
from the security clearance process.  See, e.g., Cafeteria and 
Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473, AFL-CIO v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 
886 (1961); Dorfmont v. Brown, 913 F.2d 1399 (9th Cir. 1990), 
cert. denied, 499 U.S. 905 (1991); Dubbs v. C.I.A., 866 F.2d 1114 
(9th Cir. 1989); Chesna v. United States Dept. of Defense, 850 F. 
Supp. 110 (D. Conn. 1994).   Like these plaintiffs, Stehney 
asserts NSA violated her constitutional rights and failed to 
follow its own regulations in revoking her clearance.  She is 
entitled to an adjudication of her claims on the merits.  For 
these reasons, we hold that Stehney has standing. 
B.  Political Question Doctrine  
         Even if Stehney possessed standing, the district court 
found her mandamus claim raised non-justiciable political 
questions.  Stehney, 907 F. Supp. at 816.   
         In Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 526-29 
(1988), a civilian employee of the Navy was denied a security 
clearance.  The question presented was whether the Merits System 
Protection Board, a body that reviews Civil Service employment 
decisions, had statutory authority to review the substance of the 
underlying decision to revoke the security clearance.  The 
Supreme Court held that it did not. "The grant of a security 
clearance to a particular employee, a sensitive and inherently 
discretionary judgment call, is committed by law to the 
appropriate agency of the Executive Branch."  Id. at 527.  "The 
President, after all, is the 'Commander in Chief of the Army and 
Navy of the United States.' U.S. Const., Art. II, §2.  His 
authority to classify and control access to information bearing 
on national security and to determine whether an individual is 
sufficiently trustworthy to occupy a position in the Executive 
Branch that will give that person access to such information 
flows primarily from this constitutional investment of power in 
the President and exists quite apart from any explicit 
congressional grant. . . ."  Id. at 529-30 (citations omitted).  
The Court recognized that review of security clearance decisions 
raises problems of institutional competence.  "Certainly, it is 
not reasonably possible for an outside nonexpert body to review 
the substance of such a judgment and to decide whether the agency 
should have been able to make the necessary affirmative 
prediction with confidence.  Nor can such a body determine what 
constitutes an acceptable margin of error in assessing the 
potential risk."  Id. at 529. 
         While Egan held only that the Merits System Protection 
Board lacked the competence and authority to review security 
clearance decisions under its authorizing statute, the courts of 
appeals have consistently held that under Egan, the federal 
courts may not review security clearance decisions on the merits.  
See Brazil v. U.S. Dept. of Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 197 (9th Cir. 
1995) (no judicial review of merits of security clearance 
decisions under Title VII), cert.denied, 116 S. Ct. 1317 (1996); 
Becerra v. Dalton, 94 F.3d 145 (4th Cir. 1996) (same); Guillot v. 
Garrett, 970 F.2d 1320, 1325 (4th Cir. 1992) (no judicial review 
of the merits of security clearance decisions under the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973); Dorfmont v. Brown, 913 F.2d 1399 
(9th Cir. 1990) (no judicial review of merits of security 
clearance decisions); Jamil v. Secretary, Dept. of Defense, 910 
F.2d 1203, 1206 (4th Cir. 1990) (same); Hill v. Department of Air 
Force, 844 F.2d 1407, 1413 (10th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 488 
U.S. 825 (1988).  These decisions are based on grounds of 
institutional competence, separation of powers and deference to 
the Executive on national security matters.  Thus, the federal 
courts may not "second guess" the lawful decision of an agency 
like NSA to terminate a person's access to classified 
information.   
         The district court held that Egan supported the 
conclusion that there was "a textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment" of the issue of access to classified 
information to the Executive Branch in Art. II of the United 
States Constitution and that judicial review of these decisions 
violated the separation of powers.  On this basis, the court 
declined to adjudicate Stehney's claims.  Stehney, 907 F. Supp. 
at 816-17 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).  If 
Stehney had asked for review of the merits of an executive branch 
decision to grant or revoke a security clearance, we would agree.  
But not all claims arising from security clearance revocations 
violate separation of powers or involve political questions.  
Since Egan, the Supreme Court and several courts of appeals have 
held the federal courts have jurisdiction to review 
constitutional claims arising from the clearance revocation 
process.  Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603-04 (1988); Dorfmont 
v. Brown, 913 F.2d 1399, 1402 (9th Cir. 1990); Jamil v. 
Secretary, Dept. of Defense, 910 F.2d 1203, 1209 (4th Cir. 1990); 
Dubbs. v. C.I.A., 866 F.2d 1114, 1120 (9th Cir. 1989); National 
Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Greenberg, 983 F.2d 286, 289-90 (D.C. 
Cir. 1993).  The courts also have power to review whether an 
agency followed its own regulations and procedures during the 
revocation process.  Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957); 
Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61 (1974); Doe v. Casey, 796 F.2d 
1508 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, Webster 
v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988) ; Jamil v. Secretary, Dept. of 
Defense, 910 F.2d 1203, 1208; Hill v. Department of Air Force, 
844 F.2d 1407, 1412 (10th Cir. 1988); Drumheller v. Department of 
Army, 49 F.3d 1566, 1570-73 (Fed. Cir. 1995). See also Webster v. 
Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 602 n.7; Dubbs v. C.I.A., 866 F.2d 1114, 1121 
n.9. 
         Stehney has not asked for a review of the merits of 
NSA's revocation decision.  Rather, she asserts NSA violated her 
constitutional and regulatory rights in revoking her clearance.  
Therefore, we cannot agree with the district court that the 
political question doctrine precludes review of her claims.  
Accordingly, to the extent that Stehney seeks review of whether 
NSA complied with its own regulations or violated her 
constitutional rights, we believe she presents a justiciable 
claim. 
C.  Sovereign Immunity 
         The district court also found that the United States 
had not consented to be sued for failure to follow Defense 
Department or NSA security-clearance regulations and, therefore, 
Stehney was barred from bringing suit by the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity.  Stehney, 907 F. Supp. at 819-20.  But in 
Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957), the Supreme Court held 
that the government could be sued for failure to follow its own 
regulations.  Similarly, in Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603-05 
(1988), the court held that federal courts had jurisdiction over 
constitutional claims brought by a CIA ex-employee discharged for 
security reasons. 
         It is true that "[a]bsent a waiver, sovereign immunity 
shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit." 
F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994) (citing Loeffler v. Frank, 
486 U.S. 549, 554 (1988) and Federal Housing Admin., Region No. 4 
v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 244 (1940).  But the Administrative 
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706, contains a waiver of 
sovereign immunity applicable to this case.  Section 702 provides 
in part:   
         A person suffering legal wrong because of 
         agency action, or adversely affected or 
         aggrieved by an agency action within the 
         meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to 
         judicial relief thereof.  An action in a 
         court of the United States seeking relief 
         other than money damages and stating a claim 
         that an agency or an officer or employee 
         thereof acted or failed to act in an official 
         capacity or under color of legal authority 
         shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be 
         denied on the ground that it is against the 
         United States or that the United States is an 
         indispensable party.  The United States may 
         be named as a defendant in any such action, 
         and a judgment or decree or decree may be 
         entered against the United States.   
 
Stehney's claim in count 1 falls within the scope of § 702 
because she seeks non-monetary relief -- a review of her access 
to secured information -- for a legal wrong caused by agency 
action.  The district court disagreed because it believed that 5 
U.S.C. § 701(a) renders § 702 inapplicable in this case.  Section 
701(a) provides:  
         This chapter applies, according to the 
         provisions thereof, except to the extent that 
         --  
 
              (1)  statutes preclude judicial review; or  
              (2)  agency action is committed to agency 
                   discretion by law. 
 
The district court held that under § 701(a)(1), a statute, 50 
U.S.C. § 835, precluded judicial review.  Stehney, 907 F. Supp. 
at 820.  It is true that § 835 shields NSA employment decisions, 
including security clearance decisions affecting persons 
"employed in, or detailed or assigned to" the NSA, from APA 
challenge.  Doe v. Cheney, 885 F.2d 898, 904 (D.C. Cir. 1989); 50 
U.S.C. § 831.  But Stehney was employed in the private sector by 
an NSA contractor, and was not "employed in, or detailed or 
assigned to" NSA.  Thus, § 835 is not applicable.  If Congress 
intended to shield security clearance decisions affecting NSA 
contractor employees from APA review, it would have used language 
to that effect.  See Pub.L. 100-180 § 1121 (d) (statute 
authorizing Department of Defense to conduct polygraph 
examinations as part of counter-intelligence program 
distinguishes between a "person employed by or assigned or 
detailed to the National Security Agency" and "an employee of a 
contractor of the National Security Agency").      
         The district court also held that under § 701(a)(2), 
NSA security clearance decisions are "committed to agency 
discretion by law," and are not reviewable.  Stehney, 907 F. 
Supp. at 820.  But whether or not security clearance decisions 
are committed to NSA's discretion, the agency must still follow 
its own regulations and may be sued for failure to do so.  
Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 371-73 (1957) (though statute 
granted agency "absolute discretion" regarding employee discharge 
decisions, agency must still comply with its own regulations, and 
court has jurisdiction to consider claims that it did not do so; 
claim not barred by sovereign immunity); Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 
347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954) (though government board has discretion 
to make deportation decisions, board must still follow its own 
regulations governing exercise of its discretion; claim not 
barred by sovereign immunity); Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 71 
(1974) (citing with approval ruling of Service v. Dulles); Doe v. 
Casey, 796 F.2d 1508, 1519 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (agency subject to 
suit for failing to follow its own regulations), aff'd in part 
and rev'd in part on other grounds, Webster, 486 U.S. 592 (1988); 
Hondros v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 720 F.2d 278, 293 
(3d Cir. 1983) (§ 701(a)(2) does not prohibit judicial review of 
agency compliance with statutes or regulations).  See alsoWebster v. Doe, 
486 U.S. 592, 602 n.7.   
         Nor does § 701(a)(2) preclude judicial review of 
constitutional challenges to an agency's exercise of discretion.  
Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988); Hondros, 720 F.2d at 293.  
In Webster v. Doe, the Supreme Court held that even if a statute 
grants an agency absolute discretion precluding judicial review 
of the merits of agency decisions, the federal courts may still 
consider constitutional challenges arising from the exercise of 
discretion, at least absent clear congressional intent to 
preclude such review.  The court noted that this "heightened 
showing" is required "to avoid the 'serious constitutional 
question' that would arise if a federal statute were construed to 
deny any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim."  
Webster, 486 U.S. at 603.  Since there is no statute expressly 
precluding judicial review of colorable constitutional claims 
arising from NSA's security clearance procedure, sovereign 
immunity does not preclude judicial review of Stehney's 
constitutional claims.  For these reasons, count 1 is not barred 
by sovereign immunity.    
                         IV.  The Merits 
         Although Stehney has standing and her claims are not 
barred by sovereign immunity or the political question doctrine, 
we will affirm the dismissal of Stehney's claims on the merits. 
A.  Count 1: Denial of Mandamus Relief 
         The district court ruled that even if Stehney possessed 
standing and her count 1 claim were not barred by the political 
question or sovereign immunity doctrines, it could not grant an 
injunction in the nature of mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1361.  "It 
is not disputed that the remedy of mandamus is a drastic one, to 
be invoked only in extraordinary situations."  Allied Chem. Corp. 
v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 34 (1980). 
         Stehney could have challenged NSA's alleged violations 
of her constitutional rights or NSA's failure to follow its own 
regulations under the Administrative Procedure Act. See, e.g., 
Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603-04 (1988); Dubbs v. C.I.A., 866 
F.2d 1114 (9th Cir. 1989); Mangino v. Department of Army, 818 F. 
Supp. 1432, 1438 (D. Kan. 1993); 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).  Since this 
alternative was available to Stehney, grant of a writ of mandamus 
would be improper. 
B.  Count 1: NSA's Compliance with Regulations 
         Even if Stehney had properly framed her claim that NSA 
failed to comply with its own regulations as a suit under the 
Administrative Procedure Act, we would affirm dismissal of count 
1 under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) because she alleges no facts 
constituting a failure to follow the regulations. 
         Stehney alleges, and we accept as true for the purposes 
of this appeal, that NSA revoked her security clearance solely 
because she refused to take a polygraph examination in violation 
of two specific agency regulations: DCID 1/14 §§ 5 and 12.  DCID 
1/14 § 5 provides: 
 
         Criteria for security approval of an 
         individual on a need-to-know basis for access 
         to SCI follow: 
 
         a.   The individual must be stable; trustworthy; 
              reliable; of excellent character, judgment, 
              and discretion; and of unquestioned loyalty 
              to the United States. 
 
         b.   The individual requiring access to SCI must 
              also be a US citizen. 
 
         c.   The individual's immediate family must also 
              be U.S. citizens. . . . 
 
         d.   Members of the individual's immediate family 
              and any other persons to whom he or she is 
              bound by affection or obligation should 
              neither be subject to physical, mental, or 
              other forms of duress by a foreign power or 
              by persons who may be or have been engaged in 
              criminal activity, nor advocate the use of 
              force or violence to overthrow the Government 
              of the United States or the alteration of the 
              form of Government of the United States by 
              unconstitutional means. 
 
Stehney asserts NSA failed to comply with § 5 because it revoked 
her security clearance for failure to take a polygraph 
examination, not because she failed to meet the criteria for 
access to classified information enumerated in the regulation.  
         Stehney also contends NSA violated DCID 1/14 § 12, 
which provides in part: 
         When all other information developed on an 
         individual is favorable, a minor investigative 
         requirement that has not been met should not 
         preclude favorable adjudication. . . .  The 
         ultimate determination of whether the granting of 
         access is clearly consistent with the interests of 
         national security will be an overall common sense 
         determination based on all available information.  
 
Stehney asserts that § 12 requires NSA to make determinations on 
a "whole person" standard, which precludes NSA from revoking a 
security clearance solely because one investigative requirement - 
- submission to a polygraph examination -- was not met.   
         DCID 1/14 §§ 5 and 12 must be read in context with DCID 
1/14 as a whole and in conjunction with other relevant Department 
of Defense and NSA security clearance process and polygraph 
regulations, which establish a detailed and coherent scheme for 
regulating access to classified information.  DCID 1/14 §§ 7(e) 
and 8(d) authorize, and NSA/CSS Reg. No. 122-06 § VI(10) 
requires, the use of polygraph examinations as part of the 
security clearance background investigation process.  DCID 1/14 
Annex A provides, in part:  
         Failure to Cooperate: Failure to provide 
         required security forms, releases, and other 
         data or refusing to undergo required security 
         processing or medical or psychological 
         testing will normally result in a denial, 
         suspension, or revocation of access. 
 
NSA/CSS Reg. No. 122-06 provides, in part:        
 
         Refusal to consent to, or unsatisfactory 
         completion or evaluation of any aspect of the 
         programs and procedures listed in Section VI, 
         when implemented as a requirement for 
         continued access, may result in adverse 
         personnel/administrative actions such as 
         denial of continued access to NSA/CSS 
         protected information and spaces, limitations 
         or denial of additional accesses and/or 
         security courier privileges, denials of 
         TDY/PCS assignment, and/or termination of 
         employment. 
 
 
DoD Reg. 5210.48-R, Ch. 1(A)(5) states, in part:      
 
         Persons who refuse to take a polygraph 
         examination in connection with determining 
         their continued eligibility for access . . . 
         may be denied access, employment, assignment, 
         or detail. . . . 
 
These regulations establish that DCID 1/14 §§ 5 and 12 
notwithstanding, refusal to take a polygraph examination 
constitutes sufficient grounds for revocation of a security 
clearance.  For these reasons, we cannot agree that NSA's actions 
violated the agency's own regulations.  Stehney has not stated a 
claim in count 1 for which relief may be granted, and the count 
was properly dismissed. 
C.  Count 2: Due Process 
         Stehney contends NSA deprived her of a constitutionally 
protected interest without due process of law.  Finding she had 
no protected property or liberty interest, the district court 
also ruled that in any event, Stehney had received all the 
process that was due.  Stehney, 907 F. Supp. 819-21.     
         In Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988), the 
Supreme Court stated that "it should be obvious that no one has a 
'right' to a security clearance."  Id. at 528.  Since that time, 
every court of appeals which has addressed the issue has ruled 
that a person has no constitutionally protected liberty or 
property interest in a security clearance or a job requiring a 
security clearance.  Jones v. Department of Navy, 978 F.2d 1223, 
1225-26 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Dorfmont v. Brown, 913 F.2d 1399, 1403- 
04 (9th Cir. 1990); Jamil, 910 F.2d 1203 (4th Cir. 1990); Doe v. 
Cheney, 885 F.2d 898, 909-10 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Hill v. Department 
of Air Force, 844 F.2d 1407, 1411 (10th Cir. 1988).     
         But even if Stehney possessed a constitutionally 
protected liberty or property interest, the procedure used to 
revoke Stehney's security clearance was sufficient to satisfy due 
process.  At least for that reason, her due process count was 
properly dismissed.  
         In her complaint, Stehney asserts NSA denied her due 
process by failing to allow her to confront witnesses against 
her; failing to provide her with information collected during her 
1989 reinvestigation; and denying her the opportunity to present 
live testimony at a hearing.  When measured against her claim 
that her security clearance was revoked solely because she failed 
to submit to the polygraph examination, these allegations cannot 
constitute a denial of due process.  The right to confront live 
witnesses, review information from prior investigations, or to 
present live testimony would have not have improved the fairness 
of the revocation process.  Stehney received advanced notice of 
her security clearance revocation and an opportunity to present 
documents and arguments against revocation.  She also received 
three administrative appeals.  Where a security clearance is 
denied or revoked because the subject of a background 
investigation refuses to comply with investigation procedures 
required by agency regulation, no more process is mandated.  
Therefore, count 2 was properly dismissed.   
         On appeal, Stehney asserts two other claims under the 
rubric of due process.  First, she alleges the clearance 
revocation procedures followed by NSA were not authorized by 
Congress or the President.  Yet Stehney fails to identify 
specific NSA procedures which she believes were not authorized.  
Instead, her claim rests entirely on the assertion in her brief 
that her case presents facts analogous those in Greene v. 
McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).   
         In Greene, the Department of Defense revoked a security 
clearance on the basis of confidential information without 
providing the clearance holder an opportunity to confront the 
accusing witnesses at a hearing.  The Supreme Court held that 
absent express authorization from the President or Congress the 
Department could not rely on a summary procedure that provided 
virtually no due process protections.  Stehney asserts that 
revocation of her security clearance without an evidentiary 
hearing is equally invalid absent express Presidential or 
Congressional approval.  But this case is distinguishable from 
Greene in critical respects.  Stehney asserts she was denied a 
clearance because she refuses to comply with a routine background 
investigation procedure -- the polygraph examination -- that was 
expressly authorized by Congress.  See 29 U.S.C. § 2006(b)(2).  
In these circumstances, NSA does not need express authorization 
from Congress or the President to revoke a security clearance 
without a hearing. 
         Stehney also contends NSA's use of a polygraph is a 
"random and arbitrary process" equivalent to flipping a coin.  
Although not stated explicitly, the thrust of her argument seems 
to be that regulations requiring a polygraph test violate 
substantive due process.  But nothing in the record indicates 
that this claim was raised in the district court.  For this 
reason, it is waived on appeal. Venuto v. Carella Byrne, Bain, 
Gilfillan, Cecchi & Stewart, P.C., 11 F.3d 385, 393 (3d Cir. 
1993); Frank v. Colt Industries, Inc., 910 F.2d 90, 100 (3d Cir. 
1990).   
         Even though we do not decide this issue, we note that 
if Stehney's position were to prevail, national security agencies 
could easily be foreclosed from using polygraph examinations.  
The government contends that polygraph examinations are a useful 
investigatory tool not only because they assist in distinguishing 
between truthful and deceptive persons, but because they induce 
examinees to make more comprehensive disclosures that are useful 
in an investigation.  For this reason, use of polygraph 
examinations for national security clearance investigations would 
appear to possess a rational basis sufficient to withstand 
substantive due process scrutiny.  See Anderson v. City of 
Philadelphia, 845 F.2d 1216 (3d Cir. 1988) (use of polygraph for 
preemployment screening by city police does not violate equal 
protection or substantive due process; in absence of scientific 
consensus, reasonable administrators could conclude that 
polygraph testing can distinguish between truthful and deceptive 
persons with greater accuracy than chance, and it was rational 
for administrators to conclude that use of polygraph examinations 
results in fuller, more candid disclosure).       
D.  Count 4: Equal Protection 
         Stehney contends NSA's exemption of "world class 
mathematicians" from its polygraph requirement, but not her, 
violates her constitutional right to equal protection because 
there is no rational basis for this distinction.  The district 
court dismissed this claim.  Stehney, 907 F. Supp. 823-24.  We 
agree.              
         As we have noted, there is no fundamental right to a 
security clearance.  See Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 
518, 528 (1988) ("It should be obvious that no one has a "right" 
to a security clearance.")  Nor are "non-world class 
mathematicians" a protected class for equal protection purposes.  
NSA's policy "must be upheld against equal protection challenge 
if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could 
provide a rational basis for the classification."  F.C.C. v. 
Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).  NSA 
exempts a small number of internationally renown mathematicians 
from its polygraph requirement to facilitate their recruitment 
for temporary consulting positions.  United States Government 
memorandum, "Security Processing for IDA Professional Staff 
Members and World Class Mathematicians", JA 46.  As the district 
court aptly observed: 
         In light of the recognized potential for 
         "lost talent when suitable individuals refuse 
         to participate in a polygraph examination", 
         see Redefining Security, A Report to the 
         Secretary of Defense and the Director of 
         Central Intelligence, Joint Security 
         Commission (February 28, 1994) . . . it is 
         hardly irrational to think that there may be 
         rare and singular circumstances where the 
         unique talents of an especially gifted 
         cryptologist expert may be so important to 
         the protection of national security -- and 
         needed so desperately and immediately -- that 
         the interest in procuring his or her services 
         outweighs the increase in security risks 
         occasioned by foregoing a polygraph on a one- 
         time basis.             
 
There is a rational basis for NSA's classification.  Stehney's 
equal protection claim was properly dismissed. 
         Stehney also claims NSA's polygraph exemption for world 
class mathematicians, though facially neutral, has an indirect 
discriminatory effect on women.  But a facially neutral policy 
does not violate equal protection solely because of 
disproportionate effects.  Instead a plaintiff must allege that a 
classification was adopted "`because of,' not merely `in spite 
of' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group."  Personnel 
Adm'r. of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271-72 (1979).  
"Proof of  . . .  discriminatory intent or purpose is required to 
show a violation of the equal protection clause."  Village of 
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 
252, 265 (1977).  Stehney did not allege that the facially 
neutral exemption from the polygraph requirement was adopted with 
the intent to discriminate against women, and so her claim was 
properly dismissed. 
E.  Count 5: New Jersey Employment Law Violation 
         New Jersey law provides "a cause of action for wrongful 
discharge when the discharge is contrary to a clear mandate of 
public policy."  Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 
58, 72, 417 A.2d 505, 512 (1980).  Under New Jersey law, an 
employer commits a misdemeanor if it requests an employee to take 
a lie detector test as a condition of employment.  Relying on 
this statute as evidence of New Jersey's public policy, Stehney 
contends she has a state law cause of action for wrongful 
discharge against NSA and the Institute.  The district court held 
the New Jersey anti-polygraph statute was preempted by a federal 
statute, the Employee Polygraph Protection Act (EPPA), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 2001-2009.  Stehney, 907 F. Supp. at 824-25.  We agree. 
         In English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990), 
the Supreme Court held state law may be preempted in three 
circumstances: 
         First, Congress can define explicitly the 
         extent to which its enactments preempt state 
         law. . . . Second, in the absence of explicit 
         statutory language, state law is pre-empted 
         where it regulates conduct in a field that 
         Congress intended the Federal Government to 
         occupy exclusively. . . . Finally, state law 
         is pre-empted to the extent that it actually 
         conflicts with federal law.  Thus, the Court 
         has found preemption where it is impossible 
         for a private party to comply with both state 
         and federal requirements, or where state law 
         stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
         of the full purposes and objectives of 
         Congress.   
 
English, 496 U.S. at 78-79 (internal quotations and citations 
omitted).   
         Application of these standards demonstrates the New 
Jersey statute is preempted by federal law.  
         As a threshold matter, we note NSA was never Stehney's 
employer.  Furthermore, the Employee Polygraph Protection Act, 29 
U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009, exempts NSA from coverage under the New 
Jersey statute.  Sections 2006 and 2009 of the Act provide that 
states may not regulate or prohibit the federal government from 
requiring employees of NSA contractors to take polygraph 
examinations.  Stehney was an employee of a contractor to NSA, 
and falls within the scope of the Act's preemption provisions.  
For that reason, the New Jersey polygraph statute is preempted to 
the extent it may prohibit NSA from administering a polygraph 
examination to a person in Stehney's position.  No public policy 
can flow from a preempted statute.  Stehney therefore has no 
state law action for wrongful discharge against NSA.  
         The preemption analysis with respect to the Institute 
is different.  The Institute was Stehney's employer and thus 
falls within the scope of the New Jersey polygraph statute.  
Moreover, the explicit language of 29 U.S.C. § 2006(b)(2)(A)(iii) 
applies only to actions by the federal government, and does not 
expressly preempt state regulation of private sector NSA 
contractors.  Nevertheless, it is clear that the New Jersey 
statute is preempted when applied to private sector NSA 
contractors, for it comprises "an obstacle to the accomplishment 
of the full purposes and objectives" of federal law.  Were the 
courts to give effect to the New Jersey polygraph law in this 
context, it would undermine the clear purpose and objective of 29 
U.S.C. §§ 2006 and 2009 -- to shield use of polygraph 
examinations by the federal government for national security 
purposes from state regulation.  It would also, incidentally, 
prevent any New Jersey employer from serving as an NSA 
contractor, an impermissible state interference with exclusive 
federal responsibility in matters of national security. 
F.  Count 6: New Jersey Anti-Discrimination Law 
         After dismissing counts 1 through 5, the district court 
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining 
state law claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  This decision is 
committed to the discretion of the district court.  Growth 
Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware County, Pa., 983 F.2d 1277, 1284-85 
(3d Cir. 1993).  Because all federal claims were correctly 
dismissed and the district court found that dismissal of the 
remaining state claim would not be unfair to the litigants or 
result in waste of judicial resources, we see no abuse of 
discretion. 
                          V.  Conclusion 
         For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the district court. 
